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The judgment of war: on the idea of
legitimate force in world politics
NICHOLAS RENGGER*
The twenty first century has opened, as so many centuries before it, with the drum
roll of war depressingly audible. The optimism of the early 1990s that world politics
was being remade, and that the threat of serious conflict was receding, vanished along
with the twin towers that were so much a symbol of that world, one heart-breakingly
beautiful September morning in 2001. And with the return of force and war to the
forefront of international politics, so come the inevitable questions; when, under
what circumstances, in what manner and with what restraint, may we (whoever the
we might be) use force to secure our interests, protect our families, defend our
communities or our values?
My aim in this article is to consider the idea of morally legitimate force in world
politics. That will involve (how could it not?) saying something about the jurispru-
dential status of certain key contemporary ideas about legitimacy more generally,
and especially with the idea of legality, but it is with moral legitimacy, rather than
with legitimacy of other kinds, that I am centrally concerned here. This distinction is
an important one to make in part (as we shall see in a moment) because a good deal
of discussion about the ‘legitimacy of the use of force’ in the contemporary period
elides the distinction or, worse, assumes that there is no distinction at all, but also
because I need to stipulate from the beginning that I am concerned with one
particular aspect of the understanding of the contemporary use of force (ways of
morally justifying it, if one can) without denying that one can approach it from a
number of other angles of vision.
I should also make plain that in this article I am going to concentrate on one
particular way of thinking about the justification of force, without denying – or really
even discussing – the obvious fact that there are other ways of thinking about it. My
focus will be on the Just War tradition and aside from a few comments immediately
below, and in the opening section, I am not planning to say anything about either
claims that there are other, better ways of justifying force or claims that there is no
possible way of (morally) justifying it. Both these sets of claims are, of course,
important and to fully defend the position I adopt here I need, of course, to show that
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both are mistaken1. My reasons for not doing so on this occasion are two-fold. First,
simple practicality; I have neither the time nor the space to embark on that task
here. Second, the principal aim of this article is to argue for a diﬀerent way of
conceptualising the just war tradition and its characteristic modes of argument than
the ones that have tended to dominate the field in recent years. Of course, for this
argument itself to be fully convincing I would have to show that thinking about the
justification of the use of force in other ways is inferior to that oﬀered by and through
the just war tradition. But I need first of all to suggest why I think the tradition itself
needs rethinking, and that is what I will attempt here.
These concerns shape the structure of what follows. The article is divided into four
sections. The opening section takes the recent public discussion of the Bush and Blair
government’s decision to go to war in Iraq and the controversy surrounding it as a
starting point for a discussion of the way in which just war rhetoric (and the language
of the tradition in general) is being used by contemporary writers in the world. In
particular it will look at the role played in such discussions of certain kinds of juristic
reasoning and of the way in which the dominant modes of utterance within the
tradition see the relationship between law and morality. The second section then
traces these moves back to the revival of just war thinking after the Second World
War, and examines in particular the most influential versions of the tradition in that
revival. I will say something in brief about the revival of religious theorising but my
main target in this section will be Michael Walzer’s distinctively secular version,2 far
and away the most influential secular version of the tradition in the postwar period.
The argument of this section will be that the way in which Walzer ‘revives’ or (in his
own words) ‘recaptures’ the just war does violence to some of the central insights of
earlier versions of the tradition, insights that might be able to help us to overcome the
problems alluded in the opening section. The third section of the article then seeks to
suggest what those other, earlier aspects of the tradition are that the dominant modes
of thinking about the tradition today have marginalised, and what just war
arguments might look like if the tradition was so reconceptualised. Essentially the
argument here emphasises the necessity for good judgment in the context of war,
rather than the language of justice in war per se and examining what this does to the
traditional ways of understanding the just war (jus ad bellum, jus in bello and so on)
and I also oﬀer some thought about how such a reconceptualised just war tradition
might oﬀer us tools for understanding and reflection, in the context of the
relationship between force and legitimacy today, returning to some of the concerns of
the opening section. Finally, I say something about a central debate that needs to
happen within such a reconceptualised just war tradition, and point to its significance
both for the just war and for thinking about international politics more generally.
I
On 28 April 2005, one week before the date of the British general election scheduled
for that year, the UK Prime Minster, Tony Blair, ordered the release of the full
1 In Dealing in Darkness, chapters 1 and 2 will be largely taken up with evaluating these sorts of
claims.
2 See, of course, principally Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
(NewYork: Basic Books, 1977; 2nd edn. 1992; 3rd. 2000). But see also Walzer, Arguing about War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
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document prepared for him by the Attorney General on the legality of invading Iraq.
The Prime Minister had been led to this point after a continuous and damaging
dispute between himself and his critics (many of whom were in his own party) as
to what advice had actually been received from the Attorney General prior to the
British and American invasion of Iraq, and whether any undue pressure had been put
on the Attorney General to come up with a view which favoured the legality of an
invasion. The Iraq war had become easily the most controversial decision the Blair
Government had taken in its second term and was threatening to dominate the last
week of the general election campaign. Much, if not most, of the criticism focused on
the justifications oﬀered by both the Blair government and the Bush administration
for the invasion. But the interesting point – from my point of view here – is the
character of the debate both in Britain and – in a rather diﬀerent way – in the United
States.
The Attorney General himself, in an interview with Joshua Rozenberg, The Daily
Telegraph’s legal editor, was unambiguous:
I stand by my conclusion that military action was lawful. That was a judgment I had to
reach. I reached it and I stand by it. . . . And I want to reject the suggestions that I was
leant on, or that this somehow was not my genuine opinion. These suggestions that this
was not genuinely my view – these are fantasies and they need to be seen as such . . . I
would not have hesitated to give negative advice if that had been my conclusion . . . I have
been a practising lawyer for 30 years. I have been chairman of the Bar. I have chaired
international legal organisations. I have been a deputy High Court judge. I was at the
height of my profession when I was appointed Attorney General . . . I was not going to
change that or throw that away – and I did not.3
Of course, in the case of the Attorney General himself, and indeed the British
Government which had asked for his advice (in part at the urging, we are told, of
senior military oﬃcers who were concerned about the possibility of prosecution by
the recently created International Criminal Court), it is reasonable enough at least to
begin with to focus on the question of whether or not a war would be legal. But, there
are surely two questions that are prior to any answer that one might give to this
question; the first, simply, consists in asking about the character of the ‘law’ in
question – in this case the specific set of assumptions and agreements that make up
‘international law’ – in other words it is primarily a jurisprudential question. The
second question, however, has to do with the relationship between a legal claim and
a moral one.
In the case discussed above what was perhaps oddest, at least to my eye, was that
the general discussion both amongst politicians and in the media, and independently
of what particular position was taken (pro or con the war, pro or con the
Government in general), was almost exclusively focused on whether or not the war
was ‘legal’. At no point that I am aware of, did anyone seriously discuss the surely
related question that even if it was legal, was it morally justified? Or rather, in as
much as they did, the assumption seemed to be that morality and legality were
eﬀectively, in this instance at least, one and the same. Yet a moment’s reflection
should serve to underline that this could not possibly be the case.
3 The Daily Telegraph, 26 May 2005.
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Of course, International Humanitarian law, in particular those parts of it that are
known as ‘The Laws of War’ are inextricably bound up with the history and
evolution of the just war tradition. But they are also bound up with the history and
evolution of the idea of international law itself. The codification of ‘the laws of war’
was part of a much more general phenomenon to do with the gradual ‘legalisation’
of international relations, of international law being, in Martti Koskenniemi’s words
‘the gentle civiliser of nations’4 and that, of course, is a political project. The laws of
war in their current form are, therefore, bound up with the fate – and the debates
over the fate – of that wider political project. This was one of things that the political
disputes over Iraq partly demonstrated. In the United States, a very strong body of
legal opinion had always been – to put it mildly – lukewarm about the idea of the
‘binding’ character of international law, regarding domestic law, rooted in the
constitution, as binding but international law (as, obviously, not being so rooted) as
being at best advisory. 5
Such jurisprudential arguments, together with the necessarily interpretative
character of legal argument in general, account in part for the variety of legal views
on whether or not the invasion of Iraq (or any other possible instance of the use of
force) is, or is not, legal. The point, of course, is to suggest that such arguments, far
from determining with clarity the position vis-à-vis the rights and wrongs of this or
that intervention are simply part of such arguments and cannot therefore be appealed
to in order to settle them. Whether or not the invasion of Iraq was ‘lawful’, depends
upon a particular understanding of law, of its application to the international realm
and of what kind of binding force such rules might have, and these are all matters of
considerable – and quite genuine – dispute.
But there is more. The question of the ‘legality’ of the Iraqi invasion is not only
not separable from wider philosophical and jurisprudential questions to do with the
status and character of international law (in particular) and law itself (in general) it
is also centrally bound up with the question of the relationship between legal and
moral argument. The two claims are normally, of course, seen as being related in that
generally speaking in our domestic jurisprudence we think there is a moral
requirement to obey the law, even in cases where we think the specific law in question
may be wrong. This is in part simply what it is to have a legal system – there is a
moral requirement to obey the law as such, independently of the moral worth of any
individual part of that law.6 But even in the domestic case, there are occasions when
we would wish to set aside the claim that action A, while certainly illegal, is also
immoral. It is perfectly easy to conceive of instances where actions we would regard
as moral (perhaps even morally required) would also be illegal, and in such cases the
general obligation to ‘obey the law’ would not normally be held to trump the
obligation to act morally.
4 See his wonderful book, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law
1880–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
5 This dispute is manifest in the debates within the US Supreme Court over, for example, the banning
of the execution of those under 18, partly on precedent drawn from existing international practice,
Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, dissenting emphatically on the grounds that such precedents
could not (and should not) count as binding precedents in US law.
6 There is, of course a large body of philosophical and jurisprudential literature on this issue and
those surrounding it. Classic modern statements, with special relevance to the international case,
would be H. L. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), Hans Kelsen,
General Theory of Law and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945).
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If this is true in the general realm of domestic jurisprudence, however, then it must
be equally (if not more) true in the sphere of international law and this then raises the
obvious question, if we cannot determine the specific sense of the legality of any
instance of the use of force simply in terms of the internal specifics of international
law, then we must surely look to a larger framework in which to embed such
judgments. One of the starker messages, I think, of the recent debates over the Iraq
invasion (and I have obviously only scratched the surface of them here) is the sense
conveyed by many participants in the debate that no such larger framework is
available. For many, as I have already suggested, there is a tendency to equate
legality and morality. This is perhaps especially so in Europe. But for many others,
the dismissal of the restrictions – as they are seen – of international law brings with it
a belief in state-led morality, or perhaps a clear, if not very articulate or convincing
attempt to substitute an ethos of ‘pagan virtue’ for the allegedly disabling views of
Christian morality which is held to inform the just war tradition, also usually equated
with international humanitarian law.7 In other words, both for the critics of the Iraqi
invasion as well as for many of its defenders, the idea that there was a framework of
general moral argument one might refer to in order to discuss the moral legitimacy
of the use of force was increasingly rejected.8 And aside from any wider problems this
might generate (of which more later) it made the debate over the invasion of Iraq
itself increasingly ideological, in one way or another, and therefore also, increasingly
strident and necessarily irresolvable.
II
The framework that most of the above rejects, of course, is usually referred to as the
just war and in many respects this tradition is widely seen to be in very good health.
In an article published in International Aﬀairs in 2002,9 I rehearsed the point –
certainly not original to me – that the revival of the just war tradition in the second
half of the twentieth century was one that had been in large part brought about by
events in the world. Specifically (for example) the carpet-bombing of German cities
(echoing, of course, the Germans’ own practice earlier in the war) which led to the
protests of Bishop George Bell, on traditional just war grounds – such bombing
could only be the deliberate targeting of the innocent – and most importantly of all,
of course, the Holocaust and its aftermath. Added to that were the Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals and, in due course the creation (and, let us not forget, the use) of
7 The specific reference to ‘pagan virtue’ is to Robert Kaplan’s Warrior Politics: Why Leadership
Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002) which combines a strong attempt to
rubbish the just war, with a not especially nuanced approach to ancient thought. The wider
tendencies, however, are visible in many places, from writers like Robert Kagan in Paradise and
Power (New York: Atlantic Books, 2004) to the statements of many Bush administration oﬃcials.
8 There were obviously a good many other aspects to this debate that I simply do not have time to go
into here; that all such general moral arguments are necessarily cultural or religious and therefore
bound by history and geography was one of the most common. I shall say something about this
later on.
9 See Nicholas Rengger, ‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty First Century’, International
Aﬀairs, 78:2 (2002), pp. 353–63.
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nuclear weapons to end the war against Japan.10 All of these events were forcing a
rethink of the traditional view that states simply had a right to use force in defence
of their interests, whatever they took them to be, which had been the standard view
of international society at least from Vattel onwards.11
Initially, it was largely in the areas of religious thinking on questions of war and
peace that the tradition was most obviously and most consciously rethought, perhaps
unsurprisingly. Protestant theologians, most notably Paul Ramsey and then later
James Turner Johnson, refined the traditional inherited categories and sought to
deploy them in modern contexts. But in Catholic social thought too, the tradition was
revived and discussed at length.12 Perhaps the most interesting development,
however, was the gradual secularisation of the concepts and categories of the just war
tradition and the manner in which this was both attempted and achieved. In the
academic world unquestionably the most influential contributor to this development
has been Michael Walzer, and for a moment I want both to dwell on the significance
of this in general terms and also say something about the specific arguments found
in Just and Unjust Wars.
Walzer has been, of course, one of the most influential political theorists of the last
forty years. He has written across a very wide range of topics in political theory13 and
has also been very active as a public intellectual, co-editing the leading magazine of
the American centre left, Dissent, for many years. This combination of academic and
10 This, in fact, led to one of the first sustained deployments of the just war tradition in
post-Wittgensteinean Anglophone analytic philosophy, in that Elizabeth Anscombe – student,
translator and heir of Wittgenstein – wrote two papers where she excoriated the decision to use
atomic weaponry. Anscombe, a deeply devout Catholic, drew in fact on very traditional just war
arguments (as had Bell in the controversy over strategic bombing) but her status in the
philosophical world made her arguments stand out. It was also helpful that the first of the
articles – ‘Mr Truman’s Degree’ – was in fact a response to the proposal that Oxford (where
Anscombe taught at the time) award Harry Truman, the President who authorised the dropping of
the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of course, an honorary degree. The essays are reprinted in
vol. 3 of her Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
11 For a discussion of the significance of this claim see, inter alia Richard Tuck, The Rights of War
and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order From Grotius to Kant (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1999), Thomas Pangle and Peter Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the
Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1999), and David Boucher,
Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
12 See especially Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York: Scribners,
1968) and also War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961). Ramsey’s student, James Turner Johnson, is perhaps
the person who has done most to explore the history of the tradition, especially in Ideology Reason
and the Limitation of War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), and Just War Tradition
and the Restraint of War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), but he has also
illuminatingly discussed the content of the ideas; see Can Modern War Be Just? (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1984) and Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1999).
13 Aside from Just and Unjust Wars, his most influential academic studies have probably been Spheres
of Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) and Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1987), but earlier in his career he wrote on the political thought of the
English Civil War [Revolution of the Saints (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965)], on
the debates surrounding the French Revolution and the execution of Louis XVI [Regicide and
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974)] and many essays on various aspects of
political thought and political thinking. Mostly these have been collected as volumes of essays, see
especially, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1970) and Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (South Bend:
Notre Dame University Press, 1994).
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political influence is unusual and partly accounts for the influence of many of his
writings, including – perhaps especially – his writings on war. In a symposium
published to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Just and Unjust
Wars, Michael Joseph Smith made the point that ‘since its appearance the book has
been a standard text at universities throughout the world – as well as at military
academies including West Point’ and adds that ‘I would . . . name it without
hesitation as the indispensable modern classic in the field. Most of the people I know
who teach in this area would agree.’14
Indeed. So we can agree, then, that Walzer’s book is certainly amongst the most
influential books to have revitalised the just war tradition in the postwar period. It is,
as Smith suggests, and as a host of other writers have testified, a magnificent book
and contains within it some of the best just war writing of recent decades. In this
article, however, I want to concentrate on two aspects of the book that have been
both crucial to its success but have also, I think, contributed considerably to the
kind of problems when deploying the tradition that I highlighted in the first section
above.
The first of these is the way in which Walzer sets up his account of the just war,
and this has a good deal to do, both with the origins of the book and Walzer’s more
general philosophical assumptions. In the preface to the original edition of Just and
Unjust Wars, Walzer disarmingly tells us that ‘I did not begin by thinking about war
in general, but about particular wars, above all about the American intervention in
Vietnam’ and added that ‘ in those years of angry controversy, I promised myself that
one day I would try to set out the moral argument about war in a quiet and reflective
way . . . I want to defend the business of arguing, as we did and as most people do,
in moral terms.’ He goes on to say that ‘my starting point is the fact that we do argue,
often to diﬀerent purposes to be sure, but in a mutually comprehensible fashion: else
there would be no point in arguing. We justify our conduct; we judge the conduct of
others . . . these justifications and judgments . . . are . . . a legitimate subject of study.
Upon examination they reveal, I believe, a comprehensive view of war as a human
activity and a more or less systematic moral doctrine, which sometimes, but not
always, overlaps with established legal doctrine.’15
This general argument seems to me to be exactly right. I think it does chime with
the way most people think about moral decision-making in general and thinking
about war in particular. Walzer is quite right to say that the framework for moral
thinking about war overlaps with, but is not reducible to, legal thinking about war
and he is also quite right to say, as he does a moment later, that ‘the proper method
of practical morality is casuistic in character’.16 This claim flows from his concern
with what he calls ‘the present structure of the moral world’17 rather than either
possible ideal worlds (which are not ours and which, he suggests, are often the focus
of philosophical attempts to understand morality) or with the making of the moral
world, which would involve detailed historical reconstruction of the just war
tradition. I also think (as I am sure Walzer does, though he nowhere explicitly makes
this point) that this way of reasoning about practical morality is precisely the way in
14 Michael Joseph Smith, ‘Growing Up with Just and Unjust Wars: An Appreciation’ in Ethics and
International Aﬀairs, 11 (1997), pp. 3–18, at 3–4.
15 All the above quotations are from Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd edn., pp. xvii–xix.
16 Ibid., p. xxii.
17 Ibid., p. xix.
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which the just war tradition itself reasoned, from Ambrose and Augustine to the
neo-Scholastics of the sixteenth century.18
The problem is that as Walzer moves into his analysis of just and unjust wars,
these claims recede and a rather more programmatic account of the tradition takes
their place. Most especially, the way that he sets up the ‘legalist paradigm’ and the
‘domestic analogy’ in fact do the opposite of what his opening preface suggests. In
the first place he adopts, almost causally, and from the beginning, the assumption
that the principal agents of war are states and thus structures the legalist paradigm
around his treatment of the rights of political communities. These rights, Walzer tells
us, are merely the collective form of individual rights. ‘The process of collectivisation
is a complex one’, he concedes, (but) it is best understood . . . as it has commonly
been understood since the seventeenth century, in terms of social contract theory . . .
contract is a metaphor for a process of association and mutuality, the ongoing
character of which the state claims to protect against external encroachment . . . the
moral standing of a particular state (therefore) depends upon the reality of the
common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that
protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile.’19 This way of thinking
then generates, he argues, what he calls the ‘legalist paradigm’ which, however it
might be slightly modified or reworked in practice (and he accepts that it would be)
is the basic way we should ground and frame the just war tradition: ‘It is’, he tells us,
‘our baseline, our model, the fundamental structure for the moral comprehension of
war’.20
The problem with this claim is that, unavoidably, it sets up the just war as
fundamentally state-based and connected with the language of rights as it has evolved
and developed within liberal modernity. However one interprets these facts, they
incline the tradition to a more juristic and less casuistic reading than Walzer’s
opening remarks indicated was his intention. They do so for the simple reason that
to structure an account of the tradition on the basis of rights language inevitably slots
it into the form of modern political vocabulary that engages in ‘rights talk’ and that,
necessarily, in the modern world, pushes the tradition into the arms of legalistic
reasoning. Of course, in Walzer’s own treatment of the just war as a whole, casuistic
elements remain in place (most especially in his discussion of the jus in bello in parts
three and five of Just and Unjust Wars) but they are, I think, to a large extent vitiated
by the overall setting of the jus ad bellum. And, inasmuch as Walzer’s text has been
the most influential academic and secular treatment of the tradition, this way of
thinking about the tradition has become sedimented more generally in the wider
political culture, as we saw above, and accounts in part for the rather strained aspects
of a good deal of the discussion of the tradition in connection with contemporary
conflict.
18 This is, obviously, a large claim. And, of course, I am not suggesting that there are no diﬀerences
between the original formulations of the tradition in Ambrose and Augustine and the ‘School of
Salamanca’ version of it in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The point is merely to say
that, to all intents and purposes, the general cast of the tradition for much of its existence into
modern times was as a casuistic tradition of moral reflection not as a juristic one. I have made this
point in more detail in ‘On the Just War tradition in the Twenty-First Century’. Of course that does
not solve – as we shall see – a diﬀerent problem; which is how Aristotelian the casuistry in question
has to be.
19 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 52–4.
20 Ibid., p. 61.
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Of course, it is also true that this aspect of Walzer’s book also fits very well with
the manner in which war – and indeed politics more generally – has been discussed in
the last hundred or so years; it foregrounds the state, it sees legal thought as the
baseline, if not the be all and end all of moral thinking in politics, and without
denying the powerful claims of morality on politics it also hints at the specific
character of political ethics21 and argues that in the context of war and violence, one
should see this in the particular context that international society generates.22
There is one final point I want to make in connection with Walzer’s ‘recapture’ of
the just war. Whatever might have been the case initially (and it is clear that Walzer’s
intention had always been, quite rightly, to try and look at the phenomenon of war
as a general part of the human moral realm) the events in the world since the
publication of Walzer’s book have tended to foreground certain issues over others.
As Walzer himself notes23 (and the comment is echoed in Michael Joseph Smith’s
reconsideration of Just and Unjust Wars24) the question of intervention – which had
occupied only a small part of the original treatment – has become much more
important, and in Walzer’s treatment of intervention – quite consistently given the
premises just mentioned – the state-centric and legalistic character of his account was
dramatically obvious. In his recent writing, Walzer has given some ground to his
critics on these issues and admitted a right of rescue rather more generous than his
initial treatment allowed.25 Nonetheless, he has retained a firm break on interven-
tionary impulses as, given the initial development of his theory he must. The point I
want to make here, however, is that by foregrounding intervention, Walzer’s version
of the just war has not only reinforced the state-centric and legalistic character of the
dominant contemporary forms of the tradition, it has also tended to reinforce the
view amongst both supporters and critics, that the purpose of ‘just war theory’ is to
determine, by means of some kind of moral calculus, whether this or that war was
‘just’ or ‘unjust’. And here, even the title of Walzer’s book, unexceptional as it is in
other contexts, encouraged this particular view.
These tendencies are, of course, not unique to Walzer. James Turner Johnson,
another stalwart of the contemporary just war tradition, whose historical work is a
masterpiece of reconstruction and sympathetic interpretation, gives support (perhaps
unintentionally) to the same development when, as he does for example in the
opening chapter of a recent book, he ‘summarises’ and lists the central points of the
tradition in a set of lists.26 It is not that Johnson’s presentation of the tradition is
inaccurate but rather that it encourages the tendency to think of it in terms of a
juristically based calculus where certain boxes (just cause, right authority and so on)
are ticked or not ticked and in the end one comes out with the view: yes, this was/was
not a just war.
21 A point that Walzer developed in detail in an earlier essay, one that strongly influenced Just and
Unjust Wars. See Walzer ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, in Marshall Cohen,
Thomas Nagel and Thomas Scanlon (eds.), War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1974).
22 It is worth noting that, in this respect at least, Walzer’s work is very close to the so-called ‘English
School’ of IR scholarship and to certain older versions of realism, especially Hans Morgenthau and
Rheinhold Niebuhr.
23 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd edn., new preface, p. xi.
24 See Smith, ‘Growing up with Just and Unjust Wars’, cf. ‘Perhaps no part of Just and Unjust Wars
has inspired greater debate and controversy than its discussion of intervention’, p. 15.
25 See especially ‘The Politics of Rescue’, in Arguing about War.
26 See James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare ch. 1, pp. 22–40.
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Let me summarise what I have tried to argue here. The dominant approaches in
the revival of just war argumentation in the postwar period have all, to a greater or
a lesser extent, continued and encouraged the broadly juristic reading of the tradition
that, as we saw earlier, has led to the major problems with the tradition that have
been exposed by recent controversies about the use of force. In many cases – as with
Walzer – there is a recognition of the importance of the casuistical mode of moral
argument but a failure to carry it through or to really consider what such a form of
moral reasoning means for the tradition and, therefore, for the way in which we can
use the resources of the tradition to properly consider instances of the use of force in
contemporary world politics. And the failure to think this through properly has
allowed many of the now standard criticisms of the tradition to flourish alongside its
revival; that it encourages rather than restrains, war; that it is culture or time bound,
bound to the ‘West’ or to Christianity; that it is in service to the ‘powers that be’ and
allows them to find reasons to justify what they really wish to do for other reasons.
And for all the above reasons, it is often said, the tradition – despite its great revival
since the end of the Second World War – is now in deep philosophical trouble and in
danger of eﬀective collapse. Hence the criticisms that one hears, often from the lips
of the powerful, that it is an unnecessary restraint, a relic of a bygone age, to which
we no longer need, or should pay attention.27
III
This brings me to the crux of the matter. I strongly believe such views are incorrect,
morally damaging and, in any event, unnecessary. I cannot put the matter better than
to quote Oliver O’Donovan’s recent statement that the just war tradition ‘is in fact,
neither a ‘theory’, nor about ‘just wars’, but ‘a proposal for doing justice in the theatre
of war’28 (emphasis in original). It is this claim that I now want to examine and
contrast with the manner in which the dominant way of reinterpreting the tradition
sees the issue. In doing so, I think, we can find resources to support and sustain the
revival of the just war, without falling into any of the traps or temptations I have
alluded to above and which helps us to ask important (albeit slightly diﬀerent)
questions than those asked by the dominant modes in the context of something like
Iraq. However, such a reworking of the tradition does leave us with one profound
question unanswered. The implications of that, I shall reflect upon in my final section.
Let me start by picking up the point I made a moment ago. The just war tradition
cannot tell us – and is not designed to tell us – whether this or that particular instance
of the use of force is ‘just’ or not in the generality. Again to quote O’Donovan;
it is very often supposed that just war theory undertakes to validate or invalidate particular
wars. That would be an impossible undertaking. History knows of no just wars, as it knows
of no just peoples . . . one may justify or criticise acts of statesmen, acts of generals, acts of
common soldiers or of civilians, provided one does so from the point of view of those who
performed them, i.e. without moralistic hindsight; but wars as such, like most large scale
historical phenomena, present only a question mark, a continual invitation to reflect
further’.29
27 Consider, for example, the dismissal of the tradition by the likes of Robert Kaplan. See his Warrior
Politics.
28 Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. vii.
29 O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 15.
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What, then, is the tradition designed to do? We can grasp something of this, I
think, if we reflect for a moment on one aspect of the tradition little considered by
moderns: right intention. Johnson, in his account of the tradition cited above, accepts
that this aspect of the tradition is ‘not explicitly addressed’ in the modern just war,
being subsumed into questions of just cause and right authority.30 Yet in classic just
war writing from Augustine to the sixteenth century, right intention was most
emphatically not so subsumed. Partly this was because it cut across the ‘dividing line’
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello that is in fact absent in Augustine and much less
obviously present even in someone like Vitoria.31 While part of the ‘right intention’
discussion is meant to apply to rulers – they must not have the intention of territorial
or personal aggrandisement, intimidation or illegitimate coercion – part of it is also
meant to apply to those who do the fighting; the enemy is not to be hated, there must
be no desire to dominate or lust for vengeance, and soldiers must always be aware of
the corruption that can flow from the animus dominandi.
The point here, of course, is that what the tradition – from Augustine onwards –
insisted upon, and what right intention’ was meant to gesture towards, was the
extension into the realm of war of the normal practices of moral judgment. Of course,
classic just war thinkers – Augustine above all – also recognised that war was an
extreme realm and so such an extension represents (in O’Donovan’s formulation) ‘an
extraordinary extension of ordinary acts of judgment’32 but an extension of them all
the same. This was why the two poles of the classic just war tradition were always
authority on the one hand and judgment on the other, and why, when we come to
think about judgment, the two central terms of reference were (as they are now
known to us) discrimination and proportion. In the classic treatments of the tradition
it is these distinctions that give rise to discussions about just cause, right authority
and right intent (for example) not the later (and much more problematic) tendency
to divide questions about war into the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. O’Donovan
refers to this distinction as a ‘secondary . . . and not a load bearing’33 distinction,
which I think nicely captures how we should view it. It is a useful heuristic, no more.
The problem is that the modern revival of the tradition has elevated it into an
architectonic.
How does this change the way in which we should approach the tradition from the
manner in which (say) Walzer approaches it? In the first place, it does not suppose,
as Walzer eﬀectively does, that the moral reality of war (as he puts it) is diﬀerent from
moral reality elsewhere. Although war is a realm of extremes, it is still the general
human moral realm not some separate realm, and so the ‘dirty hands argument’ that
Walzer develops elsewhere but then applies to much of his discussion of war (for
example, and most notoriously, his discussion of ‘supreme emergency’34) does not
work. Secondly, it makes no assumption about the moral primacy of the state. The
30 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 30.
31 For an extremely powerful account of the views on war of the ‘School of Salamanca’ in general,
and Vitoria in particular, see the introduction to Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawerence (eds.),
Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). An
extremely good account of the background can also be found in Pagden, Lords Of All the World:
Ideologies of Empire in Sapins, Britian and France c. 1500–1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1995).
32 O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 14., emphasis added.
33 Ibid., p. 15.
34 See, for example, ch. 16 of Just and Unjust Wars.
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question of right authority is as much a source of debate and discussion as anything
else in the tradition. It does not deny in principle that the state may be a right
authority in any given context, but nor does it assume it. It will be a matter of
judgment. States have certain competencies and not others, and other agents may
have relevant competence depending on the circumstances. Authority, to be sure,
normally flows from well-constituted government but not all such government has
‘right authority’ in all circumstances. This would need deliberation, and, in a
democracy, the deliberation would involve the people, however constituted, not just
the government. In other words, the whole framework on which Walzer (and indeed
most other contemporary just war theorists) predicate their version of the tradition
is thrown into question; not because anyone is denying either the power – either
material or moral – of the state as such, but rather by saying that power (even moral
power) does not necessarily translate into authority in the context of the use of force.
It will depend.
The third diﬀerence between this approach and the more dominant one is the
refusal to treat the jus ad bellum or jus in bello as a ‘load bearing’ distinction, which
most contemporary writers do. This has a number of implications. In the first place,
it would repudiate suggestions that one should add yet a third category, to be called
(as Walzer does in Arguing about War) jus post bellum.35 Of course, Walzer is quite
correct to say that the issue he is getting at here – justice after war – is a very
important one, but if one sees the tradition as I have suggested we see it here, it is
already centrally implicit in it. Of course, one needs to deliberate about the problems,
methods and issues that thinking about post-conflict situations raise, but these simply
become part of the task of extending justice and judgment to the realm of war. And,
of course, they should be thought about as part of the deliberation about the use of
force in the first instance. This implies a second point, which is simply that many of
the categories of the classical just war tradition flow from the twin poles of authority
and judgment. In some contexts it will be unquestionably helpful to have a list of
categories that we need to think about, but in others it will not and in any event, it
is important not to give greater weight than is necessary to the excessively juristic
aspects of the contemporary just war tradition. That these are a present and fairly
permanent feature of the contemporary scene is true; that they have negative
consequences I have tried to show. Nonetheless they are part of the way in which we
think about the use of force and it would be foolish (and probably impossible) to
ignore them. But we need to put them in context; they are tools, not masters.
So far, however, this has perhaps been a little bloodless. So how, then, might a just
war tradition that was constructed on these assumptions make sense of the
discussions we looked at earlier on, about Iraq and the decision to invade? What
diﬀerence would it make? I want to briefly suggest – and, of course, this is the merest
gesture towards what a much fuller account would oﬀer – two areas where the way
I have read the tradition would oﬀer very diﬀerent responses both from what
governments have said and were saying and what some defenders of what I shall call
the ‘modern just war’ have said as well.
The first such area is the various reasons (various and rapidly changing, one is
tempted to say) oﬀered by the Blair and Bush Governments for the invasion. Note,
by the way, that in doing this I am not for one moment impugning anyone’s sincerity.
35 See Walzer, Arguing About War, p. xiii.
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For the purposes of this essay, I will assume that the Bush and Blair governments
were completely sincere in all their protestations, at all times. The defences that were
oﬀered for the attack on Iraq varied from concern over weapons of mass destruction,
the failure of Iraq to comply with its obligations to the United Nations under the
ceasefire agreements that ended the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the character and
intentions of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the possibility of regime change in
Iraq so as to increase the possibility of democratic change elsewhere in the Middle
East.36 Many, of course, have tried to link more than one of these together. The
problem is that on no occasion was there an attempt to act in the manner that I have
suggested the tradition would require. A discussion about what right authority might
mean under these circumstances is not constituted either by constant appeals to the
United Nations system nor by an assertion that State A will simply make up its own
mind and act accordingly. It is not that in themselves these claims are wrong, it is
simply that as such they are not discussions of anything, merely assertions. The point
of the classical just war thinkers’ constant emphasis on the twin poles of authority
and judgment is that we need to weigh judgments about threat, proportion, and the
like against one another.37 This implies a deliberative posture and, of course, it is
open to ask amongst whom the deliberation is supposed to take place. Yet that
discussion did not happen either. Inasmuch as it was the governments of Britain and
the United States that were making the claims – and who were, in slightly diﬀering
ways, claiming right authority and just cause (though of course not mentioning right
intent) – it would seem to me that it was incumbent upon them both to initiate the
dialogue and oﬀer groundings for their judgments, and it is I think a legitimate
criticism to say that they did not do so.
Legitimate, that is to say, in the context of the way I have suggested reading the
tradition. It is a separate issue (for the moment) what side one takes on the substance.
Walzer, in Arguing about War, is consistently hostile to the idea of an attack on Iraq
in the circumstances of 2003. In his chapter on Iraq (actually five shorter pieces on
Iraq put together) he oﬀers an ingenious and subtle analysis that recalls the strongest
sections of Just and Unjust Wars, and the nub of his argument is that the situation in
Iraq in 2003 was no diﬀerent from 2001, 1998 or at any time since the end of the Gulf
war in 1991, but, if so, what had changed? If the threat had not (appreciably) changed
then the response did not need to change either. In this context, as he puts it
‘Saddam’s war is unjust, even though he didn’t start the fighting . . . he is defending
his regime, which . . . has no moral legitimacy . . . (but also) America’s war is unjust
. . . at this time, the threat that Iraq posed could have been met with something less
than the war we are now fighting. And a war fought before its time is not a just war.’38
One can see the power in Walzer’s arguments, but again, the sense of weighing the
alternatives, of looking, not just at the givens – that there is a war here and now – but
also at the larger questions of right authority and just cause, to say nothing of
proportion and discrimation and how such questions reflect upon the war here and
now, is missing.
36 These are the best-known stated reasons; I do not deny there might have been others.
37 For the importance of the fact of deliberation, see O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 131, and
also Grady Scott Davis, Warcraft and the Fragility of Virtue (Idaho: University of Idaho Press,
1992), of which more in a moment.
38 Walzer, Arguing about War, pp. 160–1.
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A second area concerns what I will call the imperial temptation in some recent
writing and thinking both about the just war and more widely. I should say at once
that many just war thinkers have been profoundly opposed to this – Walzer, perhaps
especially – so this part of the argument is most certainly not aimed at them. Rather
it tends to be focused on those writers and thinkers who take the tradition’s
quite proper concern with justice and turn it into something other than the kind of
concern that is appropriate for the realm of war. Here, I am perhaps especially
thinking of writers like Jean Bethke Elshtain, whose support for, and development of,
the just war tradition for many years was I think exemplary,39 but also of some
political statements, most interestingly perhaps Tony Blair’s ‘doctrine of the
international community’ outlined in the two key foreign policy speeches of his
period in oﬃce.40
In his speech in Chicago in 1999, Blair outlined what he saw as a new approach
to international relations as a whole but with very specific implications for the use of
force. He predicated it on the operation in Kosovo, of which he had been one of the
architects, but then went on to try and articulate a more general case based on that
specific one:
The most pressing foreign policy problem we [in the West] face (he argued) is to identify
the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts.
Non-interference has long been considered an important principle of international order.
And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily . . . But the principle of
non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a
purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle
neighbouring countries then they can properly be described as ‘threats to international
peace and security’. When regimes are based on minority rule they lose legitimacy – look at
South Africa.
Obviously this argument then needs to have a set of considerations of when to
intervene. He lists five:
First, are we sure of our case? . . . Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? . . .
Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations
we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? . . .
And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass expulsion of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a
diﬀerence that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.41
There is much, of course, that is unobjectionable in this, but I merely want to point
to two things. First, there is an assumption of ‘international community’ (for certain
stated reasons) but no discussion of right authority. Not only how such a ‘commu-
nity’ should be constituted but what kind of authority it would require and how it
might acquire it. Yet for the morally legitimate exercise of force, such right authority
must be in place. Secondly, while he is perfectly clear than one could not intervene in
all cases of injustice, the prevailing assumption must be that we should seek to find
reasons to do so, rather than to seek to find reasons to argue against the prohibition
39 See perhaps most obviously, Elshtain Women and War (Brighton: Harvester, 1987) and Elshtain
(ed.), Just War Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). But see, more recently, Just War Against Terror:
The Burden of American Power in A Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2003), that marks the
change I am referring to here.
40 See most significantly his speech in Chicago in 1999, which can be found at 〈http://
www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp〉.
41 Quotations from the above speech.
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not to do so. And this, to my mind, is worrying if only because it tends to place the
weight of the tradition on the attempt to secure justice rather than to prevent
injustice.
This is even clearer if one looks at Jean Elshtain’s recent book, Just War Against
Terror.42 Although, as always with Elshtain, it is very well written, the most
significant part of the argument comes towards the end where she argues for a culture
of strong ‘rights protecting states’ and argues that the only state that can truly
perform that task globally is the United States. ‘As the world’s superpower’, she
argues, ‘America bears the responsibility to help guarantee . . . International stability,
whether much of the world wants it or not . . . we, the powerful, must respond to
attacks against persons who cannot defend themselves, because they, like us are
human beings . . . and because they, like us are members of states or would-be
states.’43
For someone who has been so sympathetic to an Augustinian reading of politics
and war for much of her career, I find this view astonishing, for the real danger of this
version of the just war is the opposite of the tendencies of the dominant modes of
thinking about it; far from juridicalising it, it runs the risk of turning it into an
ideology, and more, a messianic one. Nothing could have been further from the
thoughts or the intentions of the classic just war thinkers from Augustine onwards.
The version I have briefly outlined here remains, however, true to what I take to be
the express intent of the classical just war tradition; to extend into the realm of war,
the judgments inherent in, and necessary for, our collective moral life sui generis. To
do this is neither to ‘legalise’ it (important though legal and juristic concerns quite
properly are) nor to messianise it (great and rightly demanding though the
imperatives of justice in the common life must be). Rather, it is to do justice to
ourselves and our common moral concerns even at the extremes of human life and
conduct. If we wish to realise the proper – and realistic – way of regarding and
considering the ‘moral reality of war’ it is to this that we must pay attention.
IV
And that, essentially, is the argument I wanted to make in this article. There is,
however, one final point I also want to raise. I say raise, for I shall merely raise it and
not – at least here – essay any kind of solution to it. Sharp-eyed readers will have
noted that despite my criticism of Walzer’s way of grounding the tradition, I have not
oﬀered an alternative. I have suggested, I hope plausibly, that more classical ways of
reading the just war tradition will better serve our needs and are more appropriate for
our concerns. And, of course – I hardly need add – the work that Walzer and many
others have done on the speciﬁcs of the tradition – the discussions of the casuistry of
the just war, as we might put it – will remain as essential to my reconstruction of the
tradition as they are to anyone else’s.
Yet the question of foundations remains. The just war tradition, like it or not,
originated as a self-conscious tradition out of the Christian Church; its formulations,
characteristic modes of discussion and some, at least, of its central concerns were
42 I have examined this in much greater detail than I will here in ‘Just A War Against Terror? Jean
Elshtain’s Burden and American Power’, in International Aﬀairs, 80:1 (January 2004).
43 Elshtain, Just War Against Terror, pp. 169–70.
The judgment of war 157
rooted in Christian, and indeed sometimes explicitly ecclesiological, concerns. This
has given rise to what, in our own times, is one of the most damaging criticisms of the
just war tradition as a whole, that it cannot speak to ‘non-Western’ traditions of
thinking about war and peace. There is now a veritable avalanche of books, articles
and so on that seek to speak to the allegedly very diﬀerent ways that communities
other than Christian ones have sought to think about war and its provenance and
many of these are, indeed, adding a huge amount to what we know about the manner
in which various diﬀerent religious or normative groups see the problems of war and
peace.44 The problem, of course, is that this strategy suggests in general terms that the
just war tradition itself is indeed a ‘Western’ (or at least a Christian) tradition and
that therefore what we should do – indeed all we can do – is to engage in ‘compara-
tive international political theory’ and see how all communities have understood the
problems that the just war tradition understands like this. And this, of course, means
that the just war tradition is not – and can never be – a universal tradition, which
robs it, in a certain sense at least, of its principal raison d’être.
The modern just war writers – or at least those who are not themselves
Christians45 – have tried a variety of strategies to rebut this charge. Some, like
Walzer, seek to erect the tradition on explicitly non-religious premises and argue that
the legalist paradigm and the war convention work because it is manifest that this is
how the world is. Others, for example Terry Nardin, suggest that the just war
tradition be seen as merely one variant of a universal tradition of moral reasoning
which he calls (following Alan Donegan) ‘common morality’ and which can be
shared in principle by adherents of all faiths and none.46 I have already suggested why
I find these strategies implausible and so will not say more on this here. But in any
case they are strategies chosen by those who already see the just war tradition in the
ways that I have suggested are problematic, for all their attendant virtues.
So what about an alternative? The one that seems to be the most popular (outside,
of course, of the explicitly religious) is to oﬀer some form of Aristotelian grounding
for the tradition. This is in keeping with a good deal of contemporary political theory
that has taken Aristotle as a guide for rethinking certain aspects of our ethical and
political lives.47 The advantage, of course, is that Aristotle provides a template for an
approach to human ethical and political life that is at once non-relativist and
naturalist. Without appealing to the universalism of a Kant or a Bentham, with no
overtly transcendentalist or theologically metaphysical presuppositions and yet
insisting on our special character as human animals, an Aristotelian approach oﬀers
truth without God and universals without specific cultural baggage.48
44 See, for the merest sample, Terry Nardin (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1998), Perry Schmidt-Leukel (ed.), War and Peace in the World Religions
(London: SCM Press, 2004).
45 Or, at least, Theologians. The two communities are not always, of course, coterminous.
46 For Nardin’s work on the Just War see, especially, Law, Morality and the Relations of States
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Nardin (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace.
He has also written many essays on the use of force and military intervention, which flesh out his
defence of ‘common morality’, now far more pronounced than it was in the 1983 book.
47 For three well known examples, see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981),
Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and
Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
48 And, for those of a multicultural turn of mind, there are always the narratives of the Aristotelian
School’s meetings with other, non Greek, ways of thinking in Persia, India, even – according to
some – China as well.
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For defenders of the just war tradition, Aristotle oﬀers the additional benefit of
having already been hugely influential on the tradition. Not only on Aquinas, but
also – and perhaps most importantly of all – on the neo-Scholastics of the sixteenth
century, most especially Vitoria and Suarez. So the task for the Aristotelian-minded
defender of the just war is to distil the common parts of the tradition, root them in
Aristotelian concerns and language, thereby removing the problematic and more
obviously ‘Western’, ‘Christian’ elements, and see how the tradition becomes
reformulated in the process.
Perhaps the most impressive attempt to ‘Aristoteleanise’, the just war to date,
Grady Scott Davis’ Warcraft and the Fragility of Virtue,49 does all of these things and
comes up with a version of the just war tradition certainly close to the version I have
defended here. And I would agree that an Aristotelian approach does indeed oﬀer a
good deal for those of us who have qualms about the way the tradition has evolved
over the last few decades.
However, I would add, too, a note of caution. The greatest ‘theorist’ of the just
war – if that is quite the word for him – remains, to my mind, Augustine, and this
principally for two reasons. The first is simply his abhorrence – that is not too strong
a word – of war. He recognises that the requirements of the common life may
sometimes require it, but he still laments it; as he has it in the celebrated book XIX
of The City of God, ‘the wise man they say will wage just wars. Surely if he remembers
that he is a human being, he will rather lament the fact that he is faced with the
necessity of waging just wars; for if they were not just, he would not have to engage
in them, and consequently there would be no wars for a wise man’. The second reason
is Augustine’s thoroughgoing scepticism about the claims we make for ourselves, and
especially for the claims our rulers make for themselves. This scepticism is the root of
Augustine’s rejection of groups such as the Manichees (who had once claimed him)
and even more, of course, the Pelagians (who never did). But it aﬀects too his views
of force and its legitimacy and also of the constant appeals to peace, while using
force, that rulers – and soldiers – habitually make. ‘Peace and war had a competition
in cruelty’, Augustine comments acidically during his denunciation of Roman
imperial power in The City of God, ‘and Peace won’.
In short, my fear about the Aristotelian turn in defending the just war is that it will
forget the bracing scepticism and horror of war displayed by the tradition’s first – and
greatest – thinker. For all of the power and reach of his moral philosophy, and
notwithstanding its ability to speak to many diﬀerent ways of thinking about politics,
Aristotle shares with the advocates of the modern just war a passion for classification
and categorisation that was rightly emphasised by classical just war thinkers like
Aquinas and the neo-Scholastics but which is very close to the juristic reading of the
tradition I have sought to criticise in this article. I suspect that in part that is another
reason why Aristotle appeals. If Augustine’s just war is not always entirely clear,
messier than its Thomistic or neo-Scholastic descendants and far less sure of itself
that most contemporary variants, that does not mean, to my mind, that it is any the
worse for all that.
49 Though there are interesting signs that other scholars are beginning to plough this furrow as well. A
Colloquium on Natural Law and Humanitarian Intervention held at Durham University in March
2005 at which I was present, contained a superb paper rooting the tradition in Aristotelian
philosophy, from Bob Dyson. A harbinger, perhaps, of a (if not the) future.
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An Augustinian approach50 to the question of the legitimacy of force in world
politics would preface any claim to justice in its use with the scepticism that is the
hallmark of Augustine’s thought in general. And Augustine, unlike Aristotle, was as
sceptical of ‘the powers that be’, as he was of the claims of those that would oppose
them (as critical of Rome as he was of the Donatists who would break with it).
Having good judgment in the context of war is, as Augustine would have been the
first to admit, a diﬃcult, messy and always fragile condition which we should
approach with great caution and because we should do so, we should put ourselves
or others in that position as rarely as possible. In this context, the just war tradition
becomes potentially a powerful critic of the tendency of political authority – all
political authority, in all contexts51 – to use force to achieve its aims and does not
suppose (as an Aristotelian very well might, and as certain modern Kantians certainly
do) that there are forms of political authority (liberal or democratic ones) that are
somehow free of this tendency. Yet it allows also that there might be some
circumstances where force is the morally appropriate response, notwithstanding all of
its dangers and problems, and where this is the case, we need to see the realm of war
as an extension of the moral realm more generally.
This view seems to me to recognise the truth in the fundamental realist claim that
politics will always be about the use of force in some context or other and that force
as such cannot be banished from human aﬀairs (though any particular instance of it
might, in the right circumstances, be mitigated or prevented) without claiming that as
a result, force is beyond moral judgment. Augustine, and those of his successors who
have written on such topics, have never supposed that moral judgment will prevent
the use of force or denied that often, perhaps mostly, the force that is used will go
beyond what moral judgment would, in fact, permit. Rather it is in the task of
continually holding up the mirror of our considered moral judgments in the context
of war that the tradition performs its most important role. It does not expect that
human relations will ‘progress’ (or, indeed, regress) for in these respects, there is a
certain permanence to them, but rather it oﬀers a way of thinking about, under-
standing and dealing with the inevitable dissonances of human action and conduct in
a particular sphere. In this respect, though I cannot develop this claim in detail here,
the just war tradition, like political realism, is a species of modern anti-Pelagianism
but one which I think recognises, in ways that most versions of realism do not, the
complexity of the relations between the human moral and political realms.52
50 Onora O’Neill, in a telling essay, has pointed out the distinction between Kant’s ethics (that is the
ethical thought of the historical figure Immanuel Kant), ‘Kants ethics’ (the usually erroneous ideas
about Kant’s ethics that have a good deal of contemporary currency) and Kantian ethics (ideas
deriving in some form or other from Kant’s ethics, but certainly not coterminous with them).
Substituting Augustine for Kant, this essay – and the book of which it is a part – works from a
broadly Augustinian position but does not suppose that this would necessarily be seen as in
agreement with Augustine’s thought.
51 It is also worth pointing out here that Augustine believed this to be a tendency amongst all forms of
political agents, not just ‘properly constituted ones’ – however we might interpret that condition. In
other words, political agents other than the state would fall under Augustine’s bracing scepticism as
much as the state itself – in any of its forms – would.
52 I am in the process of trying to think through the way in which what I call ‘modern
anti-Pelagianism’ has manifested itself in general in political thought from the Renaissance onwards.
A book on this theme will, I hope, eventually emerge and there I hope to discuss the relations
between such ideas as the just war tradition and various versions of realism in more detail.
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Of course that raises anew the question of grounding, the question that – I agree
with the Aristotelians – is one that needs addressing. But even that, I think, might be
possible in Augustinian terms. For now, I simply want to suggest that in questions as
stark, and as far reaching, as judging the moral legitimacy of the use of force in
contemporary world politics, Augustine’s scepticism will serve us better even than
Aristotle’s naturalism. As Hedley Bull once wrote in a diﬀerent though not unrelated
context, ‘it is better to recognize that we are in darkness, than to pretend that we can
see the light’.53
53 Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 320.
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